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Carl Landauer*
INTRODUCTION: PARADISE LOST
In the preface to Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, Peter Goodrich
provides us with an image from Jacobus Bornitius's legal emblem book of
1654, Emblematum ethico-politicorum, entitled "Custom as second
nature." ' (See Figure 1.) Goodrich has brought us into an odd world
wherein well-dressed men, no arms in sight, can write with their feet using
a quill between their toes and an inkwell set before them on the ground.
We are in an allegorical realm. There is no apparent reason why the artist
chose this odd depiction of "second nature." Goodrich, however, will
venture an explanation: "Bomitius's armless scribe has learned to write
with his feet. By minor extension, we can infer that the feet write, that it
is our actions and not our words that are most believable, that are law for
us." 2 He further explains that "the emblem shows quill and ink, page and
lines inscribed without the use of the hand, suggest[ing] a subtle
authorization of written law, of ratio scripta, of Latin, as the impress and
mark of nature."' That is the second nature referenced in the title of the
emblem or, in emblem book terms, the motto presented with the image-
although it is telling, as I will argue, that Goodrich tends to pay little
attention to the motto in his discussion.' Goodrich makes his stake clear
here by explaining that the image precedes writing. He sees the image as
an example of Derrida's writing in general, so that he can assert that what
*E-Commerce, securities, and international lawyer, who has taught history at Yale, Stanford, and
McGill Universities and international law at University of California, Berkeley, School of Law.
1. PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL EMBLEMS AND THE ART OF LAW: OBITER DEPICTA AS THE VISION OF
GOVERNANCE xxii (2014).
2. Id. at xxiii.
3. Id.
4. There may be a claim that I am being unfair since his index references 69 items under "mottos"
and 44 under "maxims," but ultimately those serve, from my perspective, more as a way to identify the
images than they are of any particular significance to Goodrich.
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we find here is "the custom and use, the immemorial practice that
common lawyers call the lex terrae, a realm of prior images, of
emblematic patterns that legal training and here the art of interpreting
obiter depicta, things seen along the way to legal judgment, can help us
apprehend."'
What Goodrich is after in this book is to resuscitate the visual realm of
law. He thus challenges us outright: "Why are we not researching and
teaching a visual literacy of law?"' For his part, Goodrich will engage an
earlier "pictorial turn in law," 7 the early modem tradition of the emblem
book, to aid him in his own pictorial turn. It is for that reason, Goodrich
tells us, that he coined the "neologism"-and he is very fond of telling us
when he has so fashioned new terms-of the book's title, obiter depicta.8
His historical investigation, ultimately, is devised to help us understand
more about the workings of law by giving us a more complete picture.
His identification of obiter depicta, he tells us, "is intended as a significant
and topical addition to the method and interpretation of contemporary
law."' We have entered the strange world of armless scribes to teach us
about our own legal world.
This review will enter that strange world, but first, in Part I, "Pay No
Attention to the Lawyer Behind the Curtain," it will place Goodrich's
effort in Legal Emblems and the Art of Law as a continuation and
expansion of his larger project as reflected in earlier writings. Part II,
"Covered Eyes and Missing Limbs: Goodrich on Emblems," will then
discuss Goodrich's specific iconography, including his teasing out the
meanings-and the plural here is important for him-of, for example,
missing sight and missing limbs, as well as his important use of the
contemporary Italian philosopher, Giorgio Agamben, to help him place the
legal emblem book in a narrative of salvation and the end of time drawn
from Christian eschatology. Part III, "Missing Forebears: Goodrich and
Emblem Studies," will address the astonishing absence in Legal Emblems
and the Art of Law of the massive scholarship on emblem books and what
that means for a reading of Goodrich's book. Part IV, "Missing
Narratives: Goodrich, History, and Constitutional Scholarship," will work
through two other related absences in Goodrich's book, namely his lack of
reference to the major historical developments contemporary with the
publishing of the emblem books in his narrative as well as the context of
political and constitutional thought of the sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, the intellectual context at the very legal and constitutional core
of his study.
5. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at xxiii.
6. Id. at 23.
7. Id. at 55.
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As mentioned above, Legal Emblems and the Art of Law is part of
Goodrich's larger project of trying to erase law's modem self-image as a
science and to repossess other, more vibrant and authentic modes of law in
order to bring them to the foreground. In his Legal Discourse of 1987,
Goodrich describes the "disciplinary mythology"o of a legal profession
confident in its own rational, scientific character. Goodrich parades
various linguistic efforts to analyze law, and none is really able to crack
law's self-mythology. They all seem to fail and are unable to return law's
lost historicity and energy. Goodrich calls for a new mode of study that
involves "the re-reading of the law and the rewriting of the legal textbook
in the space opened by the concept of law as social discourse."" In short,
Goodrich advocates replacing the current manner of legal thinking and
self-description as a "discrete logic of intradiscourse," discourse carefully
restrained within the walls of the science of law, with what he describes as
"an accumulation and crystallisation of interdiscursive meanings."' 2 Law
in the Courts ofLove (1996) begins by unearthing the existence of a High
Court of Love or Cour Amoureuse established in 1400 by Charles VI of
France with jurisdiction over the rules of love and comprised of judges
selected by a panel of women." Goodrich uses the existence of long-
forgotten courts of love to remind us of the broad range of human registers
in the legal past. He frames his study as an effort to reconstruct legal
language and text "in the languages of fate and destiny, cause and chance,
in which they received their classical expression." 4 Legal Emblems and
the Art of Law now aims at reappropriating the visual in law's past. In
this, Goodrich is also after mystery and otherworldliness. As he writes in
his conclusion, "For all its humanism, the emblem tradition has strongly
spiritual roots. It is time and again directed toward indicating the divine
causes of things and the angelological structure of law."" Although he
prefaces this elsewhere, as he did in his article, "Specters of Law,"'" he
builds on his earlier work, including Legal Discourse and Law in the
Courts of Love, and vastly expands his archeological project of law's past
in an effort to further broaden the range and meaning of law's present. I
will describe his effort as a continuation and expansion of his larger
project in Part I of this review, "Pay No Attention to the Lawyer Behind
the Curtain."
Jacobus Bomitius's scribe writing with his foot is only one of a large
10. PETER GOODRICH, LEGAL DISCOURSE: STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS, RHETORIC AND LEGAL
ANALYSIS 206 (1987).
11. Id. at 208.
12. Id.
13. PETER GOODRICH, LAW IN THE COURTS OF LOVE: LITERATURE AND OTHER MINOR
JURISPRUDENCES 1 (1996).
14. Id. at 165.
15. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 247.
16. Peter Goodrich, Specters of Law: Why the History of the Legal Spectacle Has Not Been
Written, I U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 773 (2011).
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number of images of those who are sightless or missing hands and arms-
as well as a population of misplaced hands and eyes-that inhabit
Goodrich's emblem book tradition. From a modem perspective, the
personages of Goodrich's emblems are strangely disenabled in multiple
ways, only starting with being chained or crawling on all fours. Goodrich
focuses particularly on those lacking eyesight and missing hands. For
him, their various incapacities are multivalent or at least lead us to
different interpretations in different images. The topos of eyes cast down,
as in the depiction of the medieval jurist Bartolus of Saxoferrato among
Antoine Lafrdri's mid-sixteenth-century collection of portraits, derives
from the "tradition of self-effacement."1 7 It may be important that Justice
herself is sighted while the lawyers around her are blindfolded,
establishing a hierarchy in which the judges must look to the sighted
Justice herself for justice. Goodrich offers as well that "[i]f you cannot
see it, you have to look elsewhere, use the inner eye, the eye of the
spirit."18 Basically, you are seeing the unseen. In addressing hands,
Goodrich introduces, among other things, chirology or the rhetorical art of
hand gesture. The absence of hands provides a referent for missing
eloquence. He moves among variations on those themes to images of the
blindfolded king surrounded by handless ministers and the king with a
robe populated by numerous additional eyes and hands. The role of the
minister and the judge is to provide ministerial functions to the eternal law
mediated by the king. As Goodrich argues, these images reflect the adage
that the sovereign rules but does not govern, essentially evoking the
difference between sovereignty and administration. And that difference
Goodrich draws from Giorgio Agamben, primarily in his study, The
Kingdom and the Glory.19 There Agamben analyzes the distinction
between the kingdom of God and administration through a detailed study
of the developing role of oikonomia, from a classical term referring to
household management to a religiously inspired term. Goodrich repeats
Agamben's final end of inoperativity, the eschatological folding in
oikonomia and the Glory. And he is particularly attracted to Agamben's
crescendos of pure light: "As Agamben puts it, the closer one comes to the
divinity, the greater the clamor of optical metaphors, and finally the
crescendo of pure light that marks the divine as unseeable." 20 Perhaps
Goodrich's most fundamental learning from Agamben is the distinction
between sovereignty and administration, so that the legal emblem points
us not only to administration but also to things divine: "The legal emblem
is most simply the legitimate image of law as a mixed knowledge and
17. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 41.
18. Id. at 161.
19. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE KINGDOM AND THE GLORY: FOR A THEOLOGICAL GENEALOGY OF
ECONOMY AND GOVERNMENT (Lorenzo Chiesa & Matteo Mandarini trans., 2011).
20. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 36.
[Vol. 27:2294
4
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities, Vol. 27, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 3
https://digitalcommons.law.yale.edu/yjlh/vol27/iss2/3
Landauer
practice, as an expression of 'things divine and human,' as rule and
administration, legislation and oeconomic disposition." 21 For Goodrich,
this distinction is critical, and yet, like Agamben, he wants to signal the
mediation between the two realms. Encased in that distinction is the
promise of a salvation, where the binary coalesces. Part II of this review,
"Covered Eyes and Missing Limbs: Goodrich on Emblems," will work
through Goodrich's iconography of missing sight and limbs and the
meaning he draws from it, as influenced by Agamben.
As we enter the world of Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, we are
introduced to a new and arcane world with Goodrich as our Virgil. There
is little sign of other life forms inhabiting the same world as Goodrich,
scholars working through early modem emblem books. The study of
emblem books is, however, its own discipline and includes an
international society with an affiliated journal and Festschrifts for scholars
who devoted much of their scholarly lives to the emblem. Indeed, there is
enough emblem scholarship that Peter M. Daly's most recent book on
emblems begins with a chapter on "Recent Emblem Theory." 2 2 Rather
than Harold Bloom's anxiety of influence, by which writers refashion their
predecessors to make room for their own innovation,23 Goodrich merely
jettisons a whole scholarly field so that his contentions seem, as they
might to most legal scholars, a new find and terra nuova for his active
imagination. Perhaps more significant than the absent college of emblem
scholars is that, as sharply focused as Goodrich's writing is, he does not
really provide a good grounding in the emblem tradition. He is so
invested in the visual that the text is obscured. He refers to the motto
numerous times but our eyes and our attention are barely drawn away
from the visual image. In addition, he does not establish early for his
readers that the standard form of the emblem, if not always followed, was
structured with a motto or title, the image, and then a poem. Goodrich
waits until the final page of his final chapter to set out the common
emblem structure, a pattern that "puts the rule into action in the form of an
image, a composite of picture, motto, and explanatory verse."24 The
generally recognized creator of the emblem book, Andrea Alciato, wrote
mottos and poems first, and then his publisher in Augsburg, Heinrich
Steyner, arranged for an artist, J6rg Breu, to create the accompanying
images. The images in the first edition of 1531 were often sufficiently in
conflict with the text that Alciato's edition of 1534 was printed in Paris
with a new printmaker to create entirely new images. 25 Alciato may be an
21. Id. at 70.
22. PETER M. DALY, THE EMBLEM IN EARLY MODERN EUROPE: CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY
OF THE EMBLEM 13-30 (2014).
23. HAROLD BLOOM, THE ANXIETY OF INFLUENCE: A THEORY OF POETRY (1973).
24. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 245.
25. See John Manning, A Bibliographic Approach to the Illustrations in Sixteenth-Century
Editions of Alciato's Emblemata, in ANDREA ALCIATO AND THE EMBLEM TRADITION: ESSAYS IN
2015] 295
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unusual case because the results of Steyner's combination of Alciato's text
with prints became wildly popular as a genre, but typically the author of
the text and the artist of an emblem book would at most work in
collaboration. And then we come to the question of how much the emblem
book was an especially legal genre. Goodrich is correct to identify many
of the emblem authors, such as Andrea Alciato, Barth6lemy Aneau, and
George Wither, as lawyers. Nevertheless, the emblem books seem to fit
the world of broad moral teaching rather than the specifically legal, so
among the many pages of emblem books, Goodrich gives us the pages that
most center on government and law-we do not, for example, see Cupid
stung by bees. In addition, there are a great number of meditative emblem
books, some Protestant but many more Jesuit efforts. In Part III, "Missing
Forebears: Goodrich and Emblem Studies," I will work through Goodrich
and the emblem tradition.
Finally, Goodrich is covering a period from 1531 until 1700, but he
waits almost to the end of his book before identifying the period he is
covering.26 The period, of course, includes much of the Reformation, the
Counter-Reformation's Council of Trent, the reign of Phillip II of Spain,
the French Wars of Religion, the Thirty Years' War, and, in England,
much of Henry VIII's rule, Elizabeth's rule, and the English Civil Wars-
as well as some of the important developments in the history of European
colonialism. Except for Goodrich's reading of Anglican and Protestant
themes into English emblems, the significant events of the world are
mostly invisible. So, too, does Goodrich's narrative show no sign of the
vast study of the development of legal and constitutional theory despite
repeated references to Bracton and Coke. There is, for example, no hint of
the work of Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, Brian Tierney, Kenneth
Pennington, and the like. That is significant, in part, because Goodrich is
committed to a demythologizing project, and he is writing in the context
of one of the great mythologies of British constitutional scholarship along
the lines of Hallam, Stubbs, and the rest, with only a couple of references
to Maitland. I will cover this ahistorical Goodrich in Part IV, "Missing
Narratives: Goodrich, History, and Constitutional Scholarship."
Legal Emblems and the Art of Law is an imaginative and provocative
undertaking. Even though Goodrich's study is also an act of excision,
removing traces of emblem studies, the history of the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries, and constitutional scholarship, Goodrich focuses
our attention on a very alien genre. It is a genre full of scribes writing
with their feet and ministers with stumps for arms-that is, more akin to
Pieter Bruegel the Elder's Battle of Carnival and Lent, which was painted
a quarter century after the publication of Alciato's first emblem book, than
to the lawyer's image of sixteenth- and seventeenth-century studies of
HONOR OF VIRGINIA WOODS CALLAHAN 127-176 (Peter M. Daly, ed., 1989).
26. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 207.
296 [Vol. 27:2
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Roman, civil, or common law.
I. PAY No ATTENTION TO THE LAWYER BEHIND THE CURTAIN
Legal Emblems and the Art ofLaw continues and expands the project of
Goodrich's earlier work, including Legal Discourse and Law in the Courts
of Love, in which he confronts a closed system of law that allows access
only to lawyers. Law's mythology is that it is post-mythological,
systematic, and scientific. So in each of the three books, as elsewhere in
his writing, Goodrich is engaged in opening doors to other realms and
urging an interdisciplinary legal understanding. With Legal Discourse, he
criticizes the linguistics of law and the failure to understand the historical
and the social contexts of law. In the essays of Law in the Courts of Love,
he pushes law into realms of the heart, the senses, the aesthetic, and the
literary. And in Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, he calls for a visual
law. In each case, Goodrich is engaged in an archeology, an uncovering
of buried pasts, not to display those varied pasts in museum vitrines but,
quite to the contrary, to re-enliven law. And in building his case,
Goodrich is after multivalence, or multiple meanings. Not only does he
tap new energies for the law, but in each case the result is also the further
fracturing of meaning.
Goodrich sets out in Legal Discourse to challenge the closed, formalist
understanding of the law. He tells us: "Despite the linguistically dubious
nature of the assumptions regularly made by formalistic (deductive)
theories of adjudication, lawyers and legal theorists have successfully
maintained a superb oblivion to the historical and social features of legal
language."27 He adds that legal regulation represents "control by means of
an archaic, obscure, professionalised and impenetrable language [and] no
recognition has been provided of the peculiar and distinctive character of
law as specific, socio-linguistically defined, speech community and
usage."28 Goodrich's diagnosis is clear: lawyers have created a formalistic
model of legal practice that has little to do with the real world and real
speech. Indeed, he launches an attack on law-as-writing that we will also
see in The Courts of Love and Legal Emblems and the Art of Law. After
explaining the etymology of the word codex from a specific medium for
writing, a tablet called a caudex, he argues that "[t]he connection between
writing and law is still an important one and although contemporary uses
of the term are considerably more specific and technical than its earliest
meanings, the connection is one which bears recollection." 29 We have
also lost the aid of rhetoric, which in the post-classical era became "an
incremental, didactic and largely empty form of study, focused almost
27. GOODRICH, supra note 10, at 1.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 65.
2015] 297
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obsessively upon the word and its multifarious role in the figures of
speech."30
As Goodrich looks at various efforts from the discipline of linguistics,
they are of little help because they seem perpetually trapped in the
Saussurian bipolar langue/parole model in which symbols have only an
arbitrary relationship to that which is signified by them. So, for example,
the French linguist 1mile Benveniste in his discourse linguistics, despite
the promising formulation, does not loosen the Saussurian grip and fails as
a result. Goodrich argues that Benveniste and successive linguists have
continued to accept Saussure's famous langue/parole bipolarity and,
consequently, in their attempts to overcome Saussure have done little
more than an attempt to "invert it in terms of what may be referred to as a
'linguistics' of parole, variously defined by later linguists in terms of
'enunciation', 'performance', 'message', 'text', and so on." 31 They
remain fundamentally unable to obtain a true historical understanding. 32
In the discourse described by the scholars under critique, Goodrich sees
only one defined by its being "context independent in its claims to
universality and reason; monologic rather than dialogic, distanced and
obscure in the sense of being presented as alien . .. from the commitments
and values of the heteroglot social life which is the material context of
legal control."3 3 And here he homes in on what he understands is a fear of
heteroglossia, a term he draws from his reading of Bakhtin.3 4 It is against
heteroglossia-the mixing of multiple meanings and viewpoints in
language-that legal discourse attempts to maintain its hold: "law is in
many ways defined as a specialised discipline, precisely by its constant,
centripetal, endeavour to maintain itself by differentiation and by
exclusion of the discourses and languages which surround it."35 It is, then,
the social, the historical, and indeed the instability of heteroglossia, which
he tries to promote. He proposes a turn to a revived rhetoric of law and
with it the "re-reading of the law and the rewriting of the legal textbook in
the space opened by the concept of law as social discourse" in order that
law's language will be understood "not simply as a discrete logic of
intradiscourse but as an accumulation and crystallisation of interdiscursive
meanings."" In short, Goodrich in 1987 had developed his critique of a
formalistic, text-bound jurisprudence that must open itself up to competing
meanings and competing disciplines.
30. Id. at 103.
31. Id. at 136.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 175.
34. Id. at 139-40 (quoting M.M. BAKHTIN, THE DIALOGIC IMAGINATION: FOUR ESSAYS 270
(Michael Holquist, ed., Caryl Emerson & Michael Holquist trans., 1981)).
35. GOODRICH, supra note 10, at 175.
36. Id. at 208. In pressing for rhetoric, he states: "The enduring value or applicability of rhetoric
as a discipline is to be gauged, I would suggest, in exact proportion to its ability to analyse and codify
the public dimensions of institutional discursive practice." Id. at 97.
[Vol. 27:2298
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I have mentioned the creation of courts of love in the opening essay of
Law in the Courts of Love with jurisdiction over matters of love. A court
of love is a striking find- and we are generally to understand Goodrich's
peculiar examples as "finds"-establishing the existence of an alternative
legal order in which judges were chosen for their aptitude for poetry.37
Indulging his love of lists, Goodrich quickly reminds us of the existence of
a broad array of courts that have since been obscured from view: "Even
the briefest of lists would include the ecclesiastical courts, civilian courts,
courts of conscience, courts of equity, courts of inquisition as well as laws
of the sea, of merchants, of forests, of harvests, of circuses, of fairs, of
statuses, of women, of aliens, of Jews, of towns, of hundreds, of tithings,
of manors, castles and other localities." 38 For him, these courts represent
"minor jurisprudences."39 Indeed, he offers that the common law in
England was one of many jurisdictions residing in "a pluralism of laws
which reflected the hierarchy and diversity of the sources of knowledge
and representations of truth." 40
Goodrich is providing us the prehistory of the closing of law. In telling
the story of that closing, he identifies the repression of the prevalent
pluralism of the law. He tells us that "the doctrinal tradition of common
law which developed in the first half of the seventeenth century, was
predicated upon an indicative and historically significant repression of
precisely those disciplines, knowledges and jurisdictions that constituted
not only the plurality of laws but equally the spirit, virtue and meaning of
legal judgment." 4' This establishes the modem condition of law as one of
closure. Indeed, the very science of law was "predicated on closure" and
it "sought to replace a jurisprudence based upon theocracy, nature or
ethics with a secular conception of a self-regulating system of norms or
rules."42 Perhaps Goodrich is engaged more in autopsy than diagnosis, for
he channels Nietzsche in describing the death of law. Modem law, for
him, has "ceased to be of value" and, in fact, "remains as no more than
passivity, lethargy or brute repetition: a law or logos without nomos,
namely a law which no longer produces value."
Goodrich focuses on exactly those human registers that law has closed
off. In doing so, he identifies "the loss of meaning and the repression of
sensibility" in that closure and calls for the reconstruction of a discourse
"in the languages of fate and destiny, cause and chance, in which they
37. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 1.
38. Id. at 3.
39. Id. at 2.
40. Id. at 10.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 160.
43. Id. at 178. Here Goodrich specifically references Nictzsche and his Birth of Tragedy.
Goodrich further works his engagement with Nietzsche in his co-edited book, PETER GOODRICH &
MARIANA VALVERDE, NIETZSCHE AND LEGAL THEORY: HALF-WRITTEN LAWS (2005).
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received their classical expression."" Suggesting what I can describe as
an Edenic past, Goodrich argues that the original law was poetry and its
very communal character was conveyed by a form of poetics.45 For him,
modern law is a "literature which denies its literary qualities" and is based
on the negation and repression of its own past.4 6 He tells us that "the
literary critic engaged with [modem] law must read the literature of law
through the evidence of its absence, through its repetitions and through the
failures which indicate the return of that which is repressed in law."47 If
law has lost its poetry, its rhetorical and hermeneutical past, Goodrich
urges a re-education of the senses and a return of the repressed.48 As in
Legal Discourse, that re-education reintroduces a law that is multiform. It
lies, as he begins in his listing style, "in a logic of disintegration, in
paradoxes and aporia that inevitably accompany the pursuit of similitude,
likeness or the 'semblable' into the infinite variety or change of
circumstances, of persons, places, times and their connections." 4 9
If one thinks that Goodrich has covered enough ground with the variety
of the poetic, rhetorical, and hermeneutical, he makes a visual turn in
Legal Emblems and the Art of Law by engaging with the emblem book,
even if, as I will later suggest, he does so largely by repressing the textual
within the emblem tradition. In his hyperbolic prose-at once deadly
serious and decidedly playful-Goodrich announces, again in his familiar
cataloging rhetoric:
I trace this history and trajectory, from Rome to London, from civil
to common law, from pictorial to verbal signs, but want here
briefly to introduce the project with a grander schema of what,
borrowing from our very own and most illustrious Sir Edward
Coke, we might term the "visual lines" of law, and in my
neologism the visiocracy of justice."o
Goodrich tell us-and it is not entirely clear where Augustine ends and
Goodrich begins in the sentence-that "[w]e walk, according to St.
Augustine, among images; we walk among ephemeral visual perceptions,
amidst appearances, variable personae, but also we move because of
images."s" The visual drives us to action and Goodrich finds that special
quality in images that can "excite and ignite, generate fear and hilarity, in
44. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 164-65.
45. Id. at 128.
46. Id.at 112.
47. Id.atl13.
48. I am adapting "re-education of the senses" from PETER GAY, EDUCATION OF THE SENSES
(THE BOURGEOIS EXPERIENCE 1)(1984). In his final essay of Law and the Courts ofLove, Goodrich
produced a critique of critical legal studies in the U.S. He does recognize a "certain passing [interest]
due to the power of history" but depicts this as "short-term historical journalism," and he does this
despite the significant critical historical work by Morton Horwitz and many others. GOODRICH, supra
note 13, at 216.
49. Id. at 184.
50. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at xviii.
51. Id. at 20.
[Vol. 27:2300
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ways that prose generally cannot." 5 2 Goodrich continues by asserting that
the poetic quality of the image, which is also capable-and this is key to
him-of entertaining.5 3 Following his Legal Discourse and Law in the
Courts ofLove, he sees the image as opening lost registers: "It is this latter
sense of vision and of dream, of the unraveling of the past in the present
by virtue of the various symbolic and imagistic registers of law, that the
humanistic possibilities of dogma come into play."54
If Goodrich focuses again on pluralism over the unitary, he is
particularly interested in the fact that the image represents a "veritasfalsa,
a false truth that hides and deceives, if only or not least because it is not
what it represents."" It is from Alciato that Goodrich derived the trope of
the veritasfalsa, which also intrigued Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead in
their introduction to Law and the Image:
Controversies about images permeate Western law. Their public and
overtly political expression in the iconoclastic disputes reveals not only a
deep-seated fear but also an ambiguity as to the use of art and of images
more generally. This ambiguity is vividly captured in a famous aphorism
by the Renaissance jurist Alciatus: Imago veritasfalsa, the image is a false
truth. 6
But to get to the ambiguity in the image, Goodrich also turns to their
enigmatic and finally esoteric valence. Many of the images of the emblem
tradition are "hieroglyphs, enigmas of law, esoteric symbols of erudite
meanings."" Repeatedly, he designates them as hieroglyphs, so that he is
able to assert that they draw from the late fifteenth-century obsession with
the hieroglyph." This, in fact, is a connection well identified in emblem
book scholarship. William Heckscher, art historian, first president of the
Society for Emblem Studies, and student of celebrated art historian Erwin
Panofsky, has written, for example, of the importance of a "hieroglyphic
handbook, Horapollo's Hieroglyphica" - also mentioned a number of
times by Goodrich - and identifies the scholar to whom Alciato
dedicated his emblem book, Conrad Peutinger, as a "German humanist
and student of hieroglyphs."5 9 As a student of Panofsky, Heckscher was
deeply involved in the overall esoteric interests of the
Kulturwissenschaftliche Bibliothek Warburg, which were initiated by
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 249.
55. Id. at 131.
56. COSTA DOUZINAS & LYNDA NEAD, LAW AND THE IMAGE: THE AUTHORITY OF ART AND THE
AESTHETICS OF LAW 7 (1999).
57. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 20.
58. Id. at 50.
59. William Heckschcr, Renaissance Emblems. Observations Suggested by Some Emblem-Books
in the Princeton University Library, 15/2 PRINCETON U. LIBRARY CHRON. 55-68 (1954), reprinted in
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founder Aby Warburg and were carried on after the move from Hamburg
to London by a number of scholars, including Frances Yates.60
As hieroglyphs, the images of the emblem books easily lend themselves
to Goodrich's larger project of highlighting the hidden, the ambiguous,
and the multivalent. The humanism of the emblem tradition, he tells us,
"opens law to a world of learning, to a plurality of disciplines and the
diversity of knowledges," and Goodrich makes this point with his use of
"knowledges" decisively in the plural. Moreover, images tie directly to
the human core. If Douzinas and Nead tell us that "[a]ccording to [the
French legal historian and theorist] Pierre Legendre, images help bind the
biological, unconscious, and social parts of the person," they are citing a
key influence on Goodrich-indeed, their footnote cites not only
Legendre's book, Dieu au mirroir, but also a chapter from it co-translated
by Goodrich. 6 1 Goodrich does not enter into any prolonged, or even
focused, discussion of the relationship between the image and the text,
both motto and verse, of the emblem book. Nevertheless, in pressing the
enigmatic quality of the image versus the verbal, he can maintain the text
as a possible answer to the questions posed by the image: "In being in part
incomprehensible - an aenigma iuris - the emblem also bifurcates
attention in that the encoding of the image draws the focus of the viewer to
the words that may explain it." 62 In the final paragraph of Legal Emblems
and the Art of Law, he repeats his attack on pure textuality. And there he
asserts that reading the emblem book and grappling with its images
"requires the reconstruction of a history, literary and aesthetic, verbal and
visual, because the two were inseparably intertwined." 63 He also praises
Didi-Huberman for his depiction of the image's vitality, for understanding
the image as "a living and insufflating being."64 This in turn allows
Goodrich to transition to sacramental language. In the antepenultimate
sentence of Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, Goodrich acclaims: "In
theological terms, the image has to be incarnated, made flesh." 6 ' Thus,
Goodrich can end with his final two sentences: "This animation of viewer
and image, the piercing of the flesh, the getting under the skin that the
image and the emblem alike connote can be captured in a final depiction
from Quarles's Scola cordis [this image with the motto, "The opening of
the heart," shows two figures, one winged and haloed, spearing a large
heart held aloft by the second.]. It forms a suitable opening, a proper
60. Carl Landauer, The Survival of the Classics: The German Years of the Warburg Institute
(1984) (Ph.D. thesis, Yale University).
61. DOUZINAS & NEAD, supra note 56, at 7, citing PIERRE LEGENDRE, DIEU AU MIRROIR: ETUDE
SUR L'INSTITUTION DES IMAGES (1994); Legendre, Introduction to the Theory of the Image, 8/1 L. &
CRITIQUE (Peter Goodrich & Alain Pottage trans., 1997).
62. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 253.
63. Id. at 263.
64. Id. at 264.
65. Id. at 264.
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envoi."66 With this play on opening, the speared heart thus provides a
further opening in Goodrich's scholarly project. In essence, Goodrich has
clearly tapped another source of vitality that had been covered over and
obscured by the modern legal profession. It is that vitality that offers itself
in the final sentences of Legal Emblems and the Art ofLaw.
II. COVERED EYES AND MISSING LIMBS: GOODRICH ON EMBLEMS
In the first chapter of Legal Emblems and the Art of Law, Goodrich
introduces a group portrait from around 1568, Edward VI and the Pope.
(See Figure 2.) The painting depicts the transfer of power from the
deceased Henry VIII on his lit de justice pointing to a newly anointed
Edward VI with his councilors to his side and below him and an image of
the Pope-at least as ghostly as Henry VIII-with his head bent both over
and sideways, signaling defeat. For Goodrich, the most interesting aspect
of the painting, which he analyzed in more detail in an earlier essay,
arrives with the various blank rectangles that art historians have generally
overlooked or dismissed as unfinished elements.6 7 In describing the series
of blank tableaux in the painting, he starts with the top-right image in the
window depicting soldiers pulling down idols, and in that window there is
one of the blank rectangles." In his earlier, longer analysis of the painting
(published in the book edited by Costas Douzinas and Lynda Nead),
Goodrich explains that the blank frames should be understood "as crucial
if paradoxical visual representations of the Reformers' iconoclastic
doctrine and direct expressions of the new, imageless or literal form of
law."69 In solving the puzzle of the blank spaces, Goodrich offers us a
key. In essence, the blank spaces show the potential of future law, law to
be written: "The more obvious intimation of the blank space is of the
unwritten law, meaning the law yet to be written, as in images of open
books with blank pages and unfurled maps with as yet nothing on them."
70 Hinting at an era in which the imagination was caught up in overseas
colonization and dream-worlds of The Tempest, Goodrich continues:
"Terra incognita or terra nullius is territory not yet claimed, and by the
same token the blank page is symbolic of unwritten law and so of pure
potential."" The blank tableaux suggest the future colonization of the
66. Id. He selects the technical poetic term "envoi," which is defined by Fumiss and Bath as "a
short postscript or coda consisting of a stanza which sends the poem about its business by addressing it
to its patron or summing up its message," but it is also an invitation. TOM FURNISS & MICHAEL BATH,
READING POETRY: AN INTRODUCTION 338-39 (2d ed. 2007).
67. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 33. In his earlier essay, Goodrich places this painting within a
more general trend of "blank spaces, unmarked pages, and empty frames" in paintings roughly
between 1530 and 1630. Goodrich, The Iconography of Nothing: Blank Spaces and the
Representation ofLaw in Edward VI and the Pope, in DOUZINAS & NEAD, supra note 56, at 89.
68. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 33.
69. Goodrich, Iconography ofNothing, supra note 67, at 97.
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newly found, but also of the mystery of the unknowable. Thus, Goodrich
tells us, "Within the theology of Christian common law, the image of
Edward VI is best viewed through its blank spaces, through the very
glimpse that the image provides of a beyond of all images, of the sheer
power of things unseen, of nothingness."7 2 Goodrich will tell us of blank
pages, open windows, even of books sitting on the ledge of a window, all
indicating the transfer point between the human and the unseen. The
painting of Edward VI, then, sets us on the course for Goodrich's analysis
of strange images of covered eyes and missing limbs.
When Goodrich turns to images of covered eyes, he is well aware that
"[t]he blindfold has done the rounds."" Basically, this is not new stuff.
He tells us of the medieval blindfold that was analyzed by Christian-Nils
Robert, as well as by Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis, in depictions of
condemned prisoners.74 It is clear that "[t]he bandage is in these pictures
most probably a sign of punishment, a mark of the condemned, and bears
connotations that go back to Oedipus, who tore out his eyes in penance for
his crimes,"75 Oedipus being a common reference point for the negative
meaning of blindness. Indeed, Resnik and Curtis, knowing the history of
the blindfold as a negative sign used, for example, in images of Synagoga,
try to solve the puzzle of why one of the many Justices in the Amsterdam
Town Hall was blindfolded while each of the others was sighted.76 They
rehearse the art historical analyses of the negative connotation of the
blindfold, including that of Erwin Panofsky, as well as the positive
connotation of the imagery by Cesare Ripa, and conclude that "the
Amsterdam Tribunal's one blindfolded Justice could both be influenced
by Ripa and be grounded in the tradition of Synagoga."77 For his own
part, Panofsky, in the middle of his famous essay in Studies in Iconology
on blind cupid set out in a footnote that it was E. von Mueller who had
"conclusively dealt" with the blindness of Justice as positive and that its
positive connotation of impartiality emerged based on an Egyptian
allegory that we received from Plutarch and Diodorus Siculus.7 1 In the
same footnote, Panofsky tells us that in "Cesare Ripa's Iconologia,
'Giustizia' is the only personification in which the 'occhi bendati' bear a
favourable implication-in contrast with 'Ambitione,' 'Cupido,'
'Cupiditd,' 'Errore,' 'Favore,' 'Ira', 'Ignoranza' and 'Impeto'-but even
here the motif is limited to representations of Worldly Justice, whereas
72. Id. at 36.
73. Id. at 140.
74. CHRISTIAN-NILS ROBERT, LA JUSTICE: VERTU, COURTISANE ET BOURREAU 80-3 (1993),
JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION, CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS
IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
75. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 140-41.
76. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, supra note 74, at 61-71.
77. Id. at 71.
78. ERWIN PANOFSKY, STUDIES IN ICONOLOGY: HUMANISTIC THEMES IN THE ART OF THE
RENAISSANCE 109 n. 48 (Harper & Row1962) (1939).
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Divine Justice .. . is shown with two heads, one blindfolded, the other
seeing."7 9
Although Goodrich makes a brief reference to blind justice, he is much
more concerned with the sightless judge. He starts with a portrait of
Bartolus, reproduced in a sixteenth-century collection by Antoine Lafrdry,
showing the jurist's eyelids almost entirely covering his eyes. He instructs
us: "The primary connotation of such downcast eyes is theological as
much as jurisprudential. Lawyers were priests and knowledge of law was
expressly an erudition of things divine and human."so It was because of
the jurist's high honor, mediating the word of God, that he must engage
his task with humility. And here we can see that the closed eyes refer
back to the blank rectangles of the Edward VI painting-empty tableaux
and covered eyes both indicate connection to the unseen. Goodrich here
provides the example of Fortescue: "We must judge, according to the
fifteenth-century Chief Justice Fortescue, explicitly as sacerdotes, 'with
down cast eyes,' reverently with the appropriate filial fear of the sacred
author of laws.""1 Of course, closed eyes could have a negative value, as
in Pierre Coustau's emblem with the motto, "on perfunctory judges,"
where the "endearingly realistic woodcut is of a judge unsighted by
sleep."8 2 We are instructed by Goodrich that the eyes of judges are closed
because of the aura of the realm in which they work. Indeed, even where
Law and Justitia are distinguished, as in an image from the Senneton
edition of the Corpus iuris civilis, Law is depicted with downcast eyes in
contrast with the open eyes of Justitia.83
Goodrich then turns to images of Justitia, clear-sighted and depicted
among blindfolded lawyers. As an example, he describes a woodcut from
Barth6lemy Aneau's Jurisprudentia in which Justitia is a sighted figure
proclaiming the law while the lawyers in the woodcut are blindfolded,
some of them glancing down, and to further the point, a blindfolded Cupid
walks in their midst.8 4 In addition to being sightless - "indeed they hardly
appear to be listening" - they seem to be "stumbling around, oblivious to
the light, blind and all too human."85  Not a very flattering image of
Aneau's own profession. But Goodrich ventures an interpretation, that
"[t]he blindfold on Aneau's lawyers represents an injunction not to look,
not to stare upon the earthly realm, let alone the divinity on high until they
79. Id. at I 10, no. 48. Cupid, the central figure of Panofsky's chapter, was always blindfolded and
that placed him "on the wrong side of the moral world." Id. at 109. Only a conflation with
Renaissance putti made Cupid's blindfold benign. Id. at 121. Martin Jay has also analyzed the
emergence of "blind justice": see Martin Jay, Must Justice be Blind? The Challenge of Images to the
Law, in DOUZINAS & NEAD, supra note 75, at 19-35.
80. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 40.
81. Id. at 131.
82. Id. at 137.
83. Id. at 155.
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are ready, trained, and able." 6 For Goodrich, Aneau's depiction makes
the point of lawyers matriculating, and he marshals the comic and the
endearing to establish the theological import that it "is only those who
have joined the order of the angels" who are ready to "engage with the
solemn dictates and divine decrees of the juridical."8 7 On the final page of
his chapter, "The Foolosophy of Justice and the Enigma of Law,"
Goodrich suddenly turns on us with an exclamation: "Enough with the
juridical hagiography, enough with the political theology that separates
transcendent from immanent, the acclamatory from the practical, the eyes
from sight."" But it is essentially a momentary repositioning to allow him
to emphasize that we are ultimately talking about the background of our
law, of "our common law" -this is real stuff-and to conclude with the
importance of his archeological endeavor: "It is only recovery, reworking,
returning to images that can allow for invention and novelty, foolosophy
as creativity and play.""
Along with the covered and uncovered eyes, Goodrich introduces us to
an array of hands-missing and amputated, sometimes bandaged; reaching
out; in gesture; and isolated, separated from their owners. Resnik and
Curtis, in explaining the amputated hands of Alciato's The good Prince in
his Counsel with an image of the prince surrounded by handless
ministers-apparently the same woodcut as Aneau's The good Prince
offered by Goodrich as discussed below-introduce the theme of the
judges of Thebes: "Plutarch reported that in Egypt 'statues of judges
erected at Thebes [had] no hands; and the chief of them had also his eyes
closed up, hereby signifying that among them justice was not to be
solicited with either bribery or address."'90  And they quote the
accompanying poem they found in five major English editions of Alciato
and assert that: "nothing is received from them in response to a bribe.""
Rather, the prince in the woodcut is unable to see the litigants and hence
makes his judgment by what they say. Goodrich also rehearses the
reference to the Theban judges and the admonition against bribery, which,
for example, he elicits in the context of The good prince from Thomas
Palmer's Two Hundred Poosees.92 And he draws from Christian-Nils
Robert's analysis of handless judges in the Geneva town hall to describe
the fresco as "primarily a cautionary representation, in a Calvinist setting,
of the evil of injustice."9 But, clearly, Goodrich is after more than the
mundane admonitory.
86. Id. at 161.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 165.
89. Id.
90. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 74, at 43.
91. Id.
92. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 170.
93. Id. at 172.
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In his discussion of hands, Goodrich turns to chirologia or the rhetorical
art of hand gesture. He is interested in "[t]he theatrical, the mimic world,
with its acting out, showing, making visible, and embodying [that] takes
priority over words."94 And he instructs us that "it is etymologically the
case in that dicere, to speak, comes from a root in digitus, finger, and so
'index,' the sign of something seen, the legitimacy of what the hand
viewed and touched."95 Goodrich then floats a preliminary "wild guess"
(which is never quite as provisional as the author would have us believe):
"So, as a first point, initial hypothesis, wild guess, the image of
amputation, of handless judges may be heavily indexical, extremely
complex, and irreducibly plural in its significations, but it is to an art of
the hand and a tradition of manual eloquence, of visual persuasion, of a
gesturing and doing that exceeds words that the emblem points."9' in
engaging the art of chirologia, Goodrich offers a chart of hand gestures
from Bulwer's Chirologia, or, the natural language of the hand.9 Again,
Goodrich is not solely after the rhetorical faculty of the hand, for he sees
wrapped up with the ability to gesture also an access to the truth. "To cut
the hands off, to mutilate them," he tells us, "appears to remove the
possibility of knowledge and of truth, as also of eloquence and
persuasion."9 8 Similarly, an odd element of one image reproduced in
Goodrich's book, an isolated hand placed in the corner of the image-in
Goodrich's playful terms, "a lone left hand, a severed appendage, a
missing mitt" -"marks the absent divinity and invisible truth that opens
the gates of justice."9 9 For Goodrich it is an indication of the divine
source of truth, a "synecdoche of the hidden source of law and justice."'
Using the image of the blindfolded prince surrounded by handless
counselors in The good prince from Aneau's Jurisprudentia, which, for
us, will stand in for several images offered by Goodrich of handless
counselors, we begin to see the special hierarchy that Goodrich identifies.
The counselors "cannot inscribe what the sovereign says."'0 ' From there,
Goodrich can assert: "The councilors, the ecclesiastics, ministers, judges,
and lawyers do not make the law. It comes from elsewhere; it comes from
God to the sovereign and then, without being touched it is passed on,
applied pristine and without addition, emendation, or interpolation."'02
Perhaps the extreme pictorial formulation is provided by The prince 's
administration printed in Joannes de Solorzano's Emblemata. The
94. Id. at 180.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 204 (Fig. 6.15).
98. Id. at 180.
99. Id. at 197.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 190-91.
102. Id. at 191.
20151 307
17
Landauer: Legal Emblems and the Return of the Impressed
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
woodcut shows a prince sitting on his throne, scepter in hand, with his
robe populated by an array of eyes, ears, and hands, almost a peacock's
tail of eyes, ears, and hands. (See Figure 3.) In his playful mode,
Goodrich suggests: "It helps to remember that to administrate comes from
minus, and means to be less, to have inferior standing, and here to be
missing your hands."'03 This, then, is the perfect image of the formulation
that Goodrich quotes repeatedly: "The sovereign rules, he does not
govern."
Goodrich is, indeed, fond of setting out the rule/administration binary
opposition. The legal emblem tradition itself, from what we have seen, so
often captures in its ideology the difference between rule and
administration by its marshaling of ocular and manual images. As
mentioned above, Goodrich set out that "[t]he legal emblem is most
simply the legitimate image of law as a mixed knowledge and practice, as
an expression of 'things divine and human,' as rule and administration,
legislation and oeconomic dispensation."' And in this he turns to
Giorgio Agamben. As Goodrich sets out in his essay, "Specters of Law,"
"Agamben's thesis develops from the seventeenth-century maxim rex
regnat sed non gubernat, the sovereign rules but does not govern.""o' And
Goodrich explains further:
The maxim refers to a distinction taken from theology between two
modes of divinity and two orders of being, one perfect and inactive, a pure
being that theologians discussed in terms of an idle God (Deus otiosus),
and a useless King (rex inutilis) as opposed to an active God (Deus
actuosus) and a realm of administrative practices, also termed economic
management, meaning household governance or oikonomic disposition.1 06
If the various depictions of the prince with his counselors in Goodrich's
emblem study embody this split between divine law and administration,
Goodrich repeatedly talks both of the distinction and the mediation
between the earthly and the otherworldly. In one image, he identifies two
kings or rather "a curious doubling because we see the king twice: one
time, in the background and at distance, praying in the inset picture, and
then a second time as a part object, a heart and hieroglyphic crown." 0 7
We, then, move from the tellurian or earthly to the celestial.
Decoding the empty throne, as pictured in "They reveal the man" from
Juan de Borja's Empresas morales, Goodrich states that the "empty chair,
like the blank tableau and the white page, signifies in coded form much
more than can be seen."' And here he turns again to Agamben, who has
"developed this point at length with reference to the theology of
103. Id. at 193.
104. Id. at 70.
105. Goodrich, supra note 16, at 773, 793-94.
106. Id. at 794.
107. GOODRICH, supra notc 1, at 109.
108. Id. at 94.
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administrative disposition, which he terms oikonomia, and he usefully
traces the doctrinal significance of the throne in the Old Testament and the
Psalms." 09 In fact, we are told, that Agamben finds the archetype of
power in the empty seat of power and that the "seat is pure potentia, it is
the latency and promise of justice to come"--even though Goodrich then
makes an aside to note that the Anglican approach may not be quite as
strong as the depiction by the Italian philosopher.
In Goodrich's understanding of the move from image to invisibility, he
also turns to Agamben: "The glory of God is expressed, as I am fond of
quoting, 'in a crescendo of optical images'."' Indeed, Goodrich does
seem to relish "crescendos of optical images," which becomes a recurring
motif in his book. Certainly, for Agamben, the focus is on the Glory when
time and all activity stop. In fact, in an evocative passage, Agamben
observes Aquinas making:
a sudden digression to ask if the hierarchies and orders of angels will
remain even after the Day of Judgment. The question is by no means to be
taken for granted nor is it avoidable. Indeed, once the history of the world
and its creatures has reached its end and the elect, as well as the damned,
have received either eternal bliss or eternal punishment, what is the
purpose of the existence of the orders of angels? How can we imagine
inoperative angels?'
With all of Goodrich's fondness for optical crescendos, he certainly
references Agamben's eschatology with the thematic of "inoperativity"
that is so critical to Agamben's work as a whole."12
In his turn to theological analysis, Goodrich is particularly invested in
the sacramental aspect of the emblem tradition with his repeated
references to the word made flesh." 3 The emblem, he instructs us,
"embodies a certain set of impossibilities that derive their form from the
paradox of body and soul."I' He adds that it is important to acknowledge
that the emblem represents:
a radical and frequently satirical form, and specifically in the context of
common law, it is a foreign invention, an aspect of the mos britannicus, of
a reformed Roman law of the visible brought to England and there used to
show the common lawyers the deeper and civilian structure of what they
see.'' 5
In essence, it offers a bridge not only to the Continent but also to an
109. Id. at 94-5.
110. Id. at 96.
111. AGAMBEN, supra note 19, at 159.
112. See SERGEI PROZOROV, AGAMBEN AND POLITICS: A CRITICAL INTRODUCTION (2014) (using
"inoperative" in the subtitle of every chapter after the first, such as chapter 2, "The Sabbatical Animal:
The Politics of Inoperativity").
113. He also references this earlier in GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 134.
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unseen that the Continental lawyers see. Legal Emblems and the Art of
Law continues and extends Goodrich's overall project by delving deeply
into the visual within the emblem tradition. Of course, the woodcuts and
other images examined in his book are hardly just that. For Goodrich, the
period of the emblem book represents "the instant of [legal regulation's]
visualisation leading us to the humanistic register and interdisciplinary
archive, the figurative lexicon of rule."" 6 Goodrich, never content, sees it
also going well beyond the figurative arts, so emblems also have "choral
glamor."' 17 Moreover, they represent "the inaugural didactic and theatrical
mode of manifestation, the carefully wrought staging of the performance
of justice."'" With all of his discussion of Justitia and princes on stages or
on pegma, a mechanical device to raise or lower actors to the stage, we
should have seen that coming. That is not to say he is alone in focusing on
the theatrical in the emblem book. One of the important scholars of the
emblem, Michael Bath, in his Speaking Pictures talks about the "tendency
of books, including several notable emblem books, to describe themselves
as 'theaters'.""' Addressing Renaissance culture more broadly, the world
of Stephen Greenblatt's Renaissance Self-Fashioning is fundamentally
theatrical, so that his Thomas More is very much fashioning himself
within a pageant and Henry VIII is an elaborately costumed stage
presence.120 Goodrich's turn to the choral and theatrical is, however, all
part of the Goodrichean archeology to recover the past vibrancy and,
ultimately, the glory of the law. But there are catches. The image suggests
popularity; it is, he tells us "populist in scope."' 21 That, however, is
illusory at best: "The image - the vision - can be relatively easily seen but
what is apprehended leads rapidly from the intelligible, from the readily
visible and apprehensible to the opaque matter, the Latin and other
symbols of faith and law." 22 In a sense, there are border guards for this
realm as well, for the emblem book involved "an esoteric form of
knowledge, one that the lawyers, the legally learned, believed could harm
the uninitiated." 23  Despite Goodrich's urge for the return of the
repressed, there is a sense in which, as he says elsewhere as well, some of
116. Id. at 249.
117. Id.at247.
118. Id. There is certainly reason to acknowledge the interaction and overlap of art forms. Peter
M. Daly devoted a chapter in his Literature in the Light of the Emblem to "Emblematic Drama."
PETER M. DALY, LITERATURE IN THE LIGHT OF THE EMBLEM: STRUCTURAL PARALLELS BETWEEN THE
EMBLEM AND LITERATURE IN THE SIXTEENTH AND SEVENTEENTH CENTURIES 153-186 (2d ed. 1998).
He there references both Walter Benjamin and Albrecht Sch6ne's respective works on baroque drama.
Id. at 153.
119. MICHAEL BATH, SPEAKING PICTURES: ENGLISH EMBLEM BOOKS AND RENAISSANCE
CULTURE 122 (1994).
120. STEPHEN GREENBLATT, RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING: FROM MORE TO SHAKESPEARE
(1980).
121. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 252.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 42.
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the mythos of the past has stuck to the present, so he can assert: "Ours, our
common law, is one that still silently and often unwittingly manifests a
belief in its own theogonic legitimacy, one that portrays in words the
affect and effect of the indefinite time of the most antiquated and oldest of
laws, of rules supposedly nascent beyond the memory of humanity." 2 4
He simultaneously summons the past for the rejuvenation of law and sees
the mythos of the past also tied to the mythos of the present, the legal
profession's self-mythologizing by using incantations and mystery to
enhance the lawyer's hold on legal administration - all those Latin and
law French terms that he has told us represent an esoteric cloaking of
specialized knowledge. Goodrich works to revive the theatricality of the
past, but he is quite cognizant of the theatricality of the contemporary
lawyer's self-fashioning.
III. MISSING FOREBEARS: GOODRICH AND EMBLEM STUDIES
Well into Legal Emblems and the Art ofLaw, Goodrich first asserts with
regard to Alciato's emblem book: "The point to stress is that the most
popular law book ever written, outside of the Corpus luris, and Gaius'
Institutes, expressly arrived on the juristic stage genus jocosum, as a
satirical, at times obscene work of moralizing precepts aimed to inform,
instruct, and amuse those learned in law and the arts."'25 And then he
adds nonchalantly: "The story is well enough known." In a footnote on
the page he references two studies of Alciato, but these are among the very
few references to the scholarship of the emblem, which has become its
own industry. Indeed, emblem studies include an international society and
an English-language journal, Emblematica: An Interdisciplinary Journal
for Emblem Studies. In addition, there are numerous digitization projects
by various universities and libraries making emblem books available
online.'2 6 The Glasgow University Emblem Website, one of the more
ambitious, provides access to 22 editions in different languages just of
Alciato's emblem book in addition to an array of other emblem books.
Peter M. Daly recently estimated that "in the two decades 1990-2009 over
1,400 articles, essays, and books were published in western European
languages on emblem studies." 27 And the scholarly examination of the
emblem tradition is hardly new. In the beginning of The Emblem in Early
Modern Europe, Daly states: "The last 150 years have seen many
discussions of emblem theory," and he names the most prominent
scholars, "Henry Green, Mario Praz, Robert Clements, Rosemary
Freeman, William Heckscher, Karl-August Wirth, Albrecht Schdne,
124. Id. at 165.
125. Id. at 143.
126. For the Society for Emblem Studies' digitization webpage with a links to various projects:
http://www.emblemstudies.org/digitisation-projects/.
127. DALY, supra note 22, at 2.
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Dietrich Walter J6ns, John Manning - the list could easily be extended."l2 8
Some of these names - like that of Mario Praz, who was especially
renowned for The Romantic Agony on the Romantic movement and the
erotic sensibility-were not simply names in an isolated world of emblem
scholarship. Even contemporaneous with the creation of emblems in the
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there were those, only starting with
Claude Mignault with his prefaces to Alciato, who produced theoretical
writings on the emblem, so that Michael Bath could devote a chapter of
his Speaking Pictures to "The Philosophy of Symbols," meaning the
contemporaneous philosophy.1 29 If Goodrich does reference Mignault,
there is no sense of an ongoing set of writings on the emblem book. The
emblem was at its own time, as it is now, a subject of substantial and
serious focus, if it remains a bit of a specialty.
The scholarship on the emblem is so large because of the enormity and
cultural reach of the subject. In The King's Two Bodies in 1957, Ernst
Kantorowicz ventured that, following Alciato's first book, "some 1300
authors published more than 3000 similar emblem books, while Alciati's
original work was translated into all European languages." 3 o William
Heckscher referred to Alciato's book as being "destined to become the
ancestor of an almost limitless progeny."' 3 ' Daly recently estimated that
there are "6,500 books of emblems and imprese, not all illustrated, printed
between 1531 and last year."' 3 2 Of course, the definitional lines are
contested, that is, what counts and does not count as an emblem book.
Goodrich, with his hyperfocus on the visual (even if he occasionally
references the visuality of written text as he does in his conclusion), would
not count the unillustrated books within his subject-matter. But the
emblem book represents a very broad phenomenon addressed from
inexhaustible interdisciplinary angles. Again, the border between the
emblem genre and many other facets of Renaissance culture was porous.
As Heckscher noted, "The Renaissance emblems were not born in full
panoply."' Goodrich is well aware of this and tells, for example, of the
emblem's background in heraldic devise. Nevertheless, it is not just that
the emblematists had forebears, but that they also drew from a wide
cultural range, so that Michael Bath adopts a term favored by
deconstructionists, bricolage, to describe the emblematists as tinkerers
making use of a wide range of found parts.' 3 4 Similarly, the emblem genre
seemed to reach into all corners, so that Michael Bath would tell us of the
128. Id. at 1.
129. BATH, supra note 1 19, at 130-159.
130. ERNST H. KANTOROWICZ, THE KING'S Two BODIES: A STUDY IN MEDIEVAL POLITICAL
THEOLOGY 174 (1957).
131. HECKSCHER, supra note 59, at 114.
132. DALY, supra note 22, at 4.
133. HECKSCHER, supra note 59, at 114.
134. BATH, supra note 119, at 106.
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wide use of emblems in the applied arts, their use in walls, windows, and
ceilings, such as the emblems that made their way from printed books to
the ceiling of Blickling Hall's long gallery in Norfolk.'3 5  In this mode,
Daly finds that the emblem had made its way into the material culture of
Renaissance halls and ceilings.1 36
Returning to the work of the first emblemist, Alciato's books, by
themselves, provide an enormous terrain. Resnik and Curtis mention that
Alciato's "1531 treatise, an anthology of a diverse collection of moralizing
short poems or epigrams to which his publisher added illustrations, was
reproduced in some 150 editions."' 3 7  To be sure, Goodrich is hardly
ignorant about the number of editions or their variation, but I only saw one
reference to an illustrational change reflected in the book's publication
history; he tells us that a Janus-faced image of justice and law is used in
Alciato's book, "the first such use being in a 1546 Venetian printing."'
The variations among the long timeline of Alciato editions is never
foregrounded, nothing like the chart of seven emblems in four different
editions that crosses two pages of Panofsky's Studies in Iconology as a
large footnote setting out the changes in whether Cupid is shown blind or
not.1 39 And there is Heckscher's story of going to the reading room of
Princeton's Rare Book Department during a Christmas party, only to wake
up to see a copy of the Roville-Lyon edition of Alciato that had recently
been left for him, and there he noticed the reversal of two words, which
changed the sense of the first line of the epigram, and he was then able to
trace that change from a particular edition to other editions following it.' 40
Heckscher's tale is charming, but the comparison of changes among
editions is a staple of the work done by scholars of the emblem book."41
Significantly, Goodrich also does not suggest the number of emblems in
various emblem books. One has little idea that emblem books typically
included well over 100 emblems. Indeed, scholars will focus on the
structure or ordering of the symbols, the fact that Francis Quarles's
Emblemes - an important source for Goodrich because Quarles was a
lawyer - was divided by subject matter into five books with certain
emblems providing transitions from one subject to the next.1 42 Even the
emblems of Alciato's book, Bath instructs us, were restructured by the
Lyons publishers of his book in 1548 so that they fit into specific topics,
135. Id. at 12.
136. DALY, supra note 22, at 5.
137. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 74, at 43.
138. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 72.
139. PANOFSKY, supra note 77, at 122-23 n. 73.
140. Heckscher, Pearls from a Dungheap: Andrea Alciati 's "Offensive" Emblem, "Adversus
naturam peccantes," supra note 59, at 481, 484.
141. As another example, Egon Verheyen traces a change in the depiction of Prometheus to the
influence of Michelangelo. Egon Verheyen, Alciato's Hercules, Emblem (No. 138) and Related
Scenes: Questions ofInterpretation, DALY, supra note 25, at 47, 48.
142. BATH, supra note 119, at 213-14.
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like God, Love, Fortune, Peace, Science, Honor, Prudence, and
Hostility.1 43 Yet, with an exception or two regarding a short sequence of
images, we have little sense of the broad sequencing of emblems in
Goodrich's emblem books-or even that the books had so many images.
Besides our seeing Goodrich's selectiveness about which images he
chooses for focus, we do not have a sense of how the books are put
together and that the order of the emblems may mean something.'"
If we move from the book to the specific emblems, we find that
Goodrich's focus is very much on the images and their visual power; the
texts may be referenced but the interaction between text and image is of
secondary, perhaps tertiary, interest to him. He does, of course, make
references to the interaction of image and text. For example, in his
discussion of the empty chair, he asserts: "Thus the motto for emblems of
this empty civil stage was often precisely concerned with the unseen,
spiritual qualities that the emptiness connotes, as in clarae virtutis
honores, meaning the glorious honors of virtue, or more indirectly meliora
latent, the best things lie hidden." 45 And he may speak to the import of a
motto, as he does when he points out that two emblems before the emblem
with the multiple hands, eyes, and ears is an image of the donkey seated
on a throne with the motto, "Against Sovereigns who choose inept
judges."'4 6 I believe it is only on the final page of his final chapter that he
talks to the standard tripartite motto-image-verse structure of the emblem
when he asserts: "The picture is the person (imago), the motto is a thing
(the Latin epigram as res and maiestas), and the verse is to be understood
as the embodiment of the action, meaning as insertion, as putting into
circulation, both promulgating and enacting."'4 7 And it is there to draw an
analogy from the famous person-thing-action division of Roman law.
In his recent book, Daly explains that although it is common to refer to
the three elements as motto, image, and epigram or some close variation,
he prefers to follow Albrecht Schane in the use of inscriptio, pictura and
subscriptio "because they imply nothing about the form or function of the
part in question."'4 8 Their function may vary, so, for example, "many
emblems have a title and not a motto" and "not every subscriptio is an
epigram."l 4 9 The scholars have focused a good deal on the interaction
among the parts. Heckscher in the important extended article he wrote
with Karl-August Wirth in the 1950s, suggested that the epigram should
solve, or at least help to solve-"wenigstens seine Auflasung zu
143. Id. at 33.
144. Goodrich does refer, but this is rare, to an interpretation being "supported strongly by the
surrounding emblems." GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 194.
145. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 94.
146. Id. at 194.
147. Id. at 245.
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erleichtern"-the riddle presented by the motto and the picture, with the
emphasis on help because Heckscher and Wirth go on to emphasize that it
is likely to involve deeper analysis of the form of both the poetry and the
art.15 0
Not all emblems were composed of the three standard elements.
Furthermore, their relationship is complicated by the fact that the text and
the images were usually created by different people, and, as Daly
observes, the "creator" is "something of an ambiguity since most texts
were written by someone recognized on the printed title-page as the
author, but he or she rarely produced the pictura."15 1 Indeed, to return to
the originator of the emblem book, it has become clear that he wrote the
epigrams and that Heinrich Steyner, his publisher in Augsburg, chose the
illustrator to add the images for Alciato's first edition. Michael Bath is
among many who wonder whether Alciato even "intended or anticipated
the three-part structure of motto-picture-epigram which was to become
definitive."'5 2 John Manning, in fact, has worked through a narrative of
the early editions of Alciato's emblem book. As mentioned earlier,
Steyner commissioned woodcuts by Jirg Breu, and the inconsistencies
between text and image tell the story, including a cupid holding flowers
instead of the garlands mentioned in the text. Christian Wechsel offered
to have a new edition with new prints published in Paris. As John
Manning tells the story, even the first Paris edition had to be revised to get
the elements of the cupid emblem right.' That was the story in Alciato's
case, and we find that other authors had problems with images created for
their books, so, for example, George Wither even wrote a verse to express
his dissatisfaction with the frontispiece of his Collection of Emblemes-
the same frontispiece that appears prominently in Goodrich's book
without reference to this dispute.154 Then there are the large number of
emblem books that took their images from earlier emblem books and
added new texts, so that the image was a found object and not original to
the text.' In reading Legal Emblems and the Art ofLaw, one rarely has a
sense of the disjuncture between the creation of the texts and the images.
But Goodrich would love to repeat the instruction, based on a Plutarchian
quotation about poetry offering a "speaking picture" and painting offering
150. William S. Heckscher & Karl-August Wirth, Emblem, Emblembuch, 5 REALLEXIKON ZUR
DEUTSCHEN KUNSTGESCHICHTE 85, 93 (1959). Hcckscher was quite interested in the puzzle, which
he shared with Panofsky. In fact, Heckscher told me that Panofsky used to call him "Archie" after
Nero Wolfe's sidekick in Rex Stout's mystery novels. See Landauer, supra note 60, at 227.
151. DALY, supra note 22, at 3.
152. Michael Bath, Honey and Gall or: Cupid and the Bees. A Case of Iconographic Slippage,
DALY, supra note 25, at 59, 60.
153. John Manning, A Bibliographical Approach to the Illustrations in Sixteenth-Century Editions
ofAlciato's Emblemata, DALY, supra note 25, at 127, 129-133.
154. BATH,supra note 119, at Ill.
155. Rosemary Freeman gives us the example of George Wither's A Collection of Emblemes,
published in 1635, reusing the plates of Gabriel Rollenhagen's Nucleus Emblematum Selectissimorum.
ROSEMARY FREEMAN, ENGLISH EMBLEM BOOKS 10 (1948).
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"dumb poetry" from Simonides of Ceos, crafted by Henry Hawkins for his
English translation of a French book of emblems: "If you eye wel and
marke these silent Poesies, give eare to these speaking pictures."'56
As I have stated above, Goodrich sees the emblem tradition as originally
and essentially legal in nature. Perhaps his strongest statement to that
effect is his assertion: "Be that as it may, the emblem book tradition, the
mens emblematica or pictorial turn in early modern administration, was a
fundamentally legal invention." 157
Scanning literature on the emblem book, much of it seems quite remote
from law. In her overview of the English emblem, Rosemary Freeman
tells us that "[t]he Elizabethan love for emblems and for allegory in all its
forms can, no doubt, be attributed in part to an unreflecting acceptance of
mere fashion: emblem writing was a gentlemanly accomplishment of the
same type as the ability to play the lute or to dance the lavolta."'" This
breathes more the air of Castiglione-without the courtier's role in a
social covenant-than that of Coke. And Freeman adds: "If it was one of
the normal accomplishments of a courtier, it was also one of the normal
devices of a poet. In the reign of Elizabeth emblems were so well
established as a part of social life that they slid everywhere into
literature."' 59 If William Heckscher offers that "[t]here is hardly a moral
or amatory emblem-book which does not have a picture of a moth (or
moths) attracted by the flame of a candle under mottoes such as 'For one
Pleasure a thousand paynes,"'" 0 Presumably, Goodrich would claim both
the moral and the amatory as provinces of law.
Although it is clear that a wide range of non-lawyers were occupied
with the emblem book, it may be worth returning to Alciato as the
originator to determine how much his emblem book was legally driven,
for it remains the case that he dedicated his emblem book to the humanist
Conrad Peutinger, "from one poet to another," not "from one jurist to
another," and both were close to Erasmus. Peggy Mufioz Simonds took on
the task in the 1980s of writing on "Alciati's Two Venuses as Letter and
Spirit of the Law.""' To start off, it says something that she felt she had
to make the case for Alciato as a legal thinker. She argues that Alciato
was a "provocative thinker in the mode of Renaissance Platonism," whose
"primary interests were philology, rhetoric, problems of translation, and
the workings of metaphor."'6 2 Nevertheless, she reminds us that "his
major professional concern was with the interpretation of texts-
156. Id. at 14.
157. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 54.
158. FREEMAN, supra note 155, at 3.
159. Id. at 5.
160. Heckscher, supra note 59, at 118.
161. Peggy Mufioz Simonds, Alciati's Two Venuses as Letter and Spirit ofthe Law, DALY, supra
note 25, at 95-125.
162. Id. at 98.
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specifically of the legal texts which form Justinian's Corpus iuris."63 She
specifically points out Alciato's emblem 186 added in 1546, which shows
that the "lawyer's vital interest in teaching his readers to see through the
letter of a text or through the body of law (Corpus iuris) to the hidden
spirit or meaning within is stated directly by the emblem's inscriptio from
St. Paul, II Cor. 3:6, 'Littera occidit spiritus vivificat' [The letter kills, the
spirit gives life]."'" She is clearly singing in Goodrich's chorus. And, in
reference to Athena, Simonds convinces that "Alciati's reader is expected
to know as well the importance of the goddess as the founder of the
Aeropagus, the first law court in Athens."'6 s But then she goes on to the
two Venuses, and her way to bring the Heavenly Venus to law is via Plato:
"For Plato, Beauty is in turn analogous to Goodness, Truth, and finally to
Justice."l6 6 Taking her argument, it is still the case that not every element
of Alciato's mind was captured by law. If she says that Alciato's primary
interests were "philology, rhetoric, problems of translation, and the
workings of metaphor," does that mean that those interests were
marshaled primarily in the service of law? And focusing on Alciato
himself does not tells us much about the woodcutters and engravers of the
emblem images, the very images that are at the core of Goodrich's book.
Again, looking through the vast array of images in the emblem books,
even those whose authors were lawyers, is there always a legal meaning, a
legal hook?
How, then, do we explain the absence, in fact an astonishing absence, of
the existing emblem scholarship in Goodrich's book? Goodrich has set a
distinct mood in Legal Emblems in the Art of Law. Starting with the
armless scribe in his preface and even the heart with eyes and ears floating
over a city chosen for the book's cover, it is clear that he wants his readers
to feel that they are in a strange world quite alien to their own. And part
of the mystery of this world is that he is bringing it to us essentially
unmediated, that is, without the interference of scores or hundreds of
scholars of the emblem book. He can count on many of his readers, at
least those among modern lawyers and legal scholars, not having been
introduced to this world. Indeed, even Bath opened his Speaking Pictures
by offering that when Rosemary Freeman wrote her pioneering study on
the English emblem book in 1940, she "assumed no prior knowledge of
what was then, and to some extent still remains, a largely unknown
corpus.'167 Goodrich counts on our identifying the emblem book as
priestly knowledge, and he is largely correct, although that effect might be
dispelled were he to introduce the large body of scholarship, if highly
163. Id.
164. Id. at 99.
165. Id. at 100.
166. Id. at 101.
167. BATH, supra note 1 19, at 1.
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specialized, that has been devoted to the emblem book. In short,
Goodrich's narrative of disembodied hands involves a sleight of hand. He
wants his reader to identify this strange new world of curious images as
his discovery, a find that, like the Courts of Love, he can draw to our
attention and place in his context. But this move - his refusal to
acknowledge the existing Baedeker guidebooks - allows Goodrich to
recharacterize the emblem book as primarily a legal vehicle. For him, he
Alciatos, the Withers, and the Quarleses were not lawyers working in a
broad humanistic enterprise where legal themes find their place within a
range of moral, aesthetic, and religious themes, but lawyers working in a
fundamentally legal enterprise where all themes, in the end, are legal.
IV. MISSING NARRATIVES: GOODRICH, HISTORY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL
SCHOLARSHIP
I have mentioned that Legal Emblems and the Art of Law covers the
period from 1531 until 1700 and that the period, in turn, includes
enormously important developments in European and, more specifically,
English history. The period includes most of the developments of the
Reformation as well as the Counter-Reformation, including the creation of
most of the Reform movements, such as Calvinism (Calvin's Institutes
being published in 1536), and Counter-Reformation events, such as the
Council of Trent and the growth of the Society of Jesus. It includes the
Thirty Years' War that engulfed much of Europe, the reign of Phillip II in
Spain and its broad impact; both the Edict of Nantes by Henry IV in 1598,
granting tolerance to French Huguenots, and its revocation in 1685 by
Louis XIV, not to mention the reign of Louis XIV and the development of
French mercantilism; untold numbers of events in Italy, including the
Habsburg-Valois wars; the creation of the Dutch Republic; and the reign
of Henry VIII and Elizabeth I in England, as well as the English Civil
Wars. In addition, it represents a period of major colonial development by
various European states. This list may appear to identify the standard
markers of the traditional introductory textbook. Nevertheless, it is
important to understand that almost none of those worldly developments
appear in Goodrich's book. The main exception is, of course, his use of
Edward VI and the Pope and his talk of a "bloated and dying King Henry
VIII, propped up in bed and pointing past his son Edward VI to his
councilors."'6 8 Positioned below Edward is "the pope, his head bowed
under the weight of the Holy Scriptures." 69 Interestingly, Goodrich does
not even indicate that the painting was created after Edward's reign - that
is simply not important to him. He does identify the painting as "a much
commented and juridically significant representation of the visible transfer
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of power."' But Goodrich here is not as explicit about the historical
context as he is in his essay, "The Iconography of Nothing," where he
states: "The context of the painting is a common law that, through the
English Reformation and the Henrician Act of Supremacy, had arrogated
the spiritual jurisdiction and its courts of conscience to the Crown.""'
The key to what Goodrich is doing may be provided by his repeated
references to the "longue durde." Initially, I thought this was one of his
clever turns of a phrase, playing with a term of art artistically out of
context. It soon became clear, however, that he meant to use the term
decidedly in its original sense as made famous by the French Annales
School of historians that had been founded by Marc Bloch and Lucien
Febvre before the Second World War. Fernand Braudel inaugurated the
use of the term in a famous article, "Histoire et Sciences sociales. La
longue durde," which he published in 1958 in the school's journal.'72
Braudel and other historians of the group, including Emmanuel Le Roy
Ladurie and Jacques Le Goff, were very clear that historians would be
advised not to focus on traditional political events-vdnements-like
much of my list above but, rather, on deep social structures viewed over a
much longer time-horizon. In the introduction to Legal Emblems and the
Art of Law, Goodrich refers to his "embarking on the recollection and
elaboration of the longue dur& of legal images."'73 He is perhaps more
explicit about his use of the term in Law and the Courts ofLove, where he
states: "The transmission of law, its passage over the longue dure or
indefinite time of institutional structures is a matter of the communication
or passing on of the dignities, places, roles and other sites of subjectivity,
of the personae or identities of historical being."'7 4
Putting aside the annus mirabilis of 1531 in Goodrich's narrative, what
is important to him is reflected by his constant references to "Anglican"
and "reformed" throughout Legal Emblems and the Art of Law. He is
deeply interested in the ideological move from the Continent to England
as reflected in his references to "classical Anglican maxims," "classical
Anglican terminologies," "Anglican answers,"' 75 and the like; the
reference to "classical" is again to suggest that this approach was carried
over a long period and may remain with us today. References to
"reformed" similarly populate his book. In essence, he is interested in
setting out a way of seeing things, a mental framework - in annalyste
terms, a mentalit - from the English Anglican, reformist perspective,
170. Id.
171. Goodrich, The Iconography of Nothing, supra note 67, at 100. In that essay, he also provides
more specific historical context for the painting, via the scholarship of Margaret Aston, as an
admonition to Queen Elizabeth. Id. at 94.
172. Fernand Braudel, Histoire et Sciences sociales. La longue durde, 13/4 ANNALES. HISTOIRE,
SCIENCES 725 (1958).
173. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 8.
174. GOODRICH, supra note 13, at 140-41.
175. For examples, see GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 52, 80, 85, 94, 95, 102, 214, 215.
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which, however, does not make much room for the seventeenth-century
Anglican/Puritan divide, in part because he is after the longue duree rather
than regicide and the catastrophic, even to the point of not fitting his
authors into their various political and religious factions, not identifying,
for example, which were Royalist and which Puritan.
If Goodrich appropriates the longue dure of the Annales School, he
shows no visible trace of the immense constitutional and legal historical
literature of both Europe generally and England specifically, including the
work of scholars of the likes of Quentin Skinner, J.G.A. Pocock, Brian
Tiemey, Robert L. Benson, Walter Ullmann, Kenneth Pennington, and
Alan Cromartie, each of whom traces the development of political and
constitutional ideas. And here I thought it worth delving very briefly and
selectively into a work by each of Tierney, Pennington, and Skinner to
suggest a part of the missing background of Goodrich's Legal Emblems
and the Art of Law. Goodrich has engaged us in a narrative in which the
common law and English reformist thought are closely tied-loud denials
of the English reformers aside-to the Continent and to Roman law, civil
law, and Catholic sources. Despite Goodrich's reference to "our very own
and most illustrious Sir Edward Coke"17 6 as well as possessive references
to other English legal luminaries from Bracton to Blackstone, Goodrich
does not make it easy to follow his tracing of Continental influences on
English legal thought nor even make it clear when a particular author of an
emblem book is English or Continental. In short, his book could have
made use of the constitutional and legal narratives provided by scholars
working along the lines of Tiemey, Pennington, or Skinner.
To start with Brian Tierney's Religion, Law and the Growth of
Constitutional Thought 1150-1650, it sets out to argue that we can only
possibly understand the growth of Western constitutional thought if "we
consider constantly, side by side, ecclesiology and political theory" and if
"we consider the whole period from 1150 to 1650 as a single era of
essentially continuous development."l77 Tierney, like the other two
historians in my sample, is hardly engaged in a discussion of vinements.
He starts his narrative with Roman and canon lawyers of the twelfth
century. He is interested in telling the story of canonist thought "where
religious and secular ideas most obviously intersected" and, ultimately for
him, "formed a kind of seedbed from which grew the tangled forest of
early modem constitutional thought."'" 8 From there, Tierney proceeds
through the centuries, tracing the development of limits on the sovereign
prince, consent theories of government, and the idea of the mixed
constitution. With regard to the development of the theory of mixed
176. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at xviii.
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constitutions, he tells that we could look-as Pocock would also do-to
Renaissance humanism. Simultaneously, he explains that we should also
look to the late-medieval conciliarists in their need to address the schism
and the existence of more than one pope and vesting the authority of the
Church more broadly in the councils of bishops when there was no single
pope. In a parenthesis that stands out for not being parenthetical, Tierney
offers: "(Perhaps we shall all eventually learn to see civic humanism and
conciliarism as two alternative rhetorical strategies through which the
communal ethos of the Middle Ages was transmitted to the early modern
world.)"'79 And he ends his narrative with the seventeenth-century
writings of George Lawson, which, he maintains, anticipated much of
Locke's writing of a few decadeslater. As he tells us, "Lawson's work
may seem as much a finale as a prelude."'s In his slim volume, then,
Tierney has traced an evolution of constitutional ideas that builds on its
past and progresses slowly by steps, and it travels from the Continent to
England.
Kenneth Pennington, in The Prince and the Law, 1200-1600, similarly
paces himself through an evolution of constitutional thought.' In his first
chapter, after referencing the sixteenth-century thought of Jean Bodin,
Pennington moves backwards to establish the first stage of his
evolutionary tale: "Although the terminology was different, the jurists of
the twelfth century were the first since late antiquity to pose the question
of whether the prince was bound by any laws."' 82 From there, he is off to
the races or, rather, to a slow progression regarding the positioning of the
prince, rehearsing various versions of the prince's sovereignty, with
authority over "positive law" but whose authority was itself not absolute,
whether bound alternatively by natural law, reason, or the commonwealth.
As Pennington states toward the end of his book: "The evolution of
political thought in the West is complex and varied.""'
Quentin Skinner, in the second volume of his Visions of Politics, sets
out a long argument that pre-humanist political leaders, drawing from
Roman sources-primarily Cicero and Sallust in addition to the Codex of
Roman law-represent the most significant background for the
development of early modern European republican constitutionalism. For
him, the "recovery and adaptation of Aristotle's texts largely served to
confirm and underpin two earlier traditions of thought in which the
distinctive arrangements of the early communes had already been very
effectively celebrated and legitimized."'84 Like Tierney's and
179. Id. at 87.
180. Id. at 98.
181. KENNETH PENNINGTON, THE PRINCE AND THE LAW, 1200-1600: SOVEREIGNTY AND RIGHTS
IN THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION (1993).
182. Id. at 9.
183. Id. at 236.
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Pennington's complicated evolutions, Skinner's involves the "recovery of
classical values, including the values of republican self-government," as
"a long and incremental process."' In a striking example of neo-Roman
republicanism, Skinner provides a convincing analysis of Ambrogio
Lorenzetti's fourteenth-century frescos in the Palazzo Pubblico in Siena
depicting The rule of tyranny, The rule of virtuous government, and The
effects of virtuous government in the city. Moving from fresco to fresco,
he is able to demonstrate how Lorenzetti's political imagination was
shaped by Cicero and Sallust. Skinner will also devote chapters to
Machiavelli, Thomas More's Utopia, as well as to John Milton's political
writings, in an effort to work through the development of European
political and constitutional ideas. Although these chapters are episodic in
the structure of the book, Skinner uses them to sketch the developmental
process of political thought.
I have briefly introduced Tierney, Pennington, and Skinner as a small
sample of the missing touchstones for Goodrich's account of legal
emblems, part of the broader context of his narrative of Alciato's emblem
book and its progeny. The historians I have chosen would not, I think, be
uncongenial references for Goodrich. Like him, they are mostly engaged
in long-term narratives. In fact, the so-called Cambridge School of
historians-which includes Skinner as well as Pocock-is broadly
contextualist, seeking to take in a wider picture. Pocock, for example,
would make use of the annalyste term, mentalit, in an unmistakable
gesture to the Annales School, as he does in his appendix written in 1986
for the republication of his study originally published in 1957, The Ancient
Constitution and the Feudal Law. Indeed, referencing his original
chapters on the common-law mind, Pocock titles a section, "The
'Common-Law Mind,' Considered as Mentalit." 8 6  Historians of
constitutional, political, and legal thought, such as these, could have
provided useful background for Legal Emblems and the Art of Law. All of
Goodrich's sovereigns ruling but not governing are missing the back-story
of deeper constitutional and legal history. Agamben is no substitute for an
entire field of historical scholarship.
CONCLUSION: THE PAINT OF ROME AND ITS PENTIMENTO
Peter Daly instructs us that "[i]t should be remembered that emblems
derive from the pre-Linnean period, and consequently what we may today
identify as an egret might have been named 'pelican' in the early modern
text."'87 When we enter the world of the emblem genre, we are well
185. Id.
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advised that we are entering a different world with different signposts.
Goodrich has clearly brought us into this foreign world, with emphasis on
its strangeness, one with ministers missing hands, hearts being speared,
trees bursting out of mouths, and rows of men crawling on all fours; and
he has made a strong case for his interpretation of the political theology of
the emblem book tradition as it moves from the Continent and is adopted
as a means of expression for the Anglican, common law imagination.
With their Reformist iconoclasm, English lawyers had worked to eliminate
the "paint of Rome," but as Goodrich tells us in Specters of the Law, "[t]he
Anglican lawyers never took off the paint of Rome."'" The emblem
book, with its obvious Continental origins, was adapted for English
purposes, but the Continental, the theatrical, the paint remained part of its
essence.
Kantorowicz in The King's Two Bodies traces the background of
Elizabethan concepts of the twinned natures of the king, the Body natural
and the Body politic, to medieval sources, and then works forward to
demonstrate the Christological structure of the Elizabethan "legal
fiction."l89 Kantorowicz describes the Elizabethan lawyers in Plowden's
Reports resolving a case by turning to "the medieval concept of the king's
character angelicus" and having thereby "gained a foothold on, so to
speak, firm celestial ground." 90 Goodrich's English lawyers are similarly
caught up in medieval mysteries and the emblem book is one of the means
of transmission. As mentioned above, "it is a foreign invention, an aspect
of the mos britannicus, of a reformed Roman law of the visible brought to
England and there used to show the common lawyers the deeper and
civilian structure of what they see."'91
For Goodrich, the whole emblem book tradition is a treasure trove to
raid in his effort to return the dynamism to a dry-as-dust profession with
its pretensions of scientism. But, of course, he wants to have it both ways.
His diagnosis of his profession is not merely its scientific self-
mythologizing, its sense of the rationality of law and the lawyer; but in
Legal Emblems and the Art of Law he also identifies the legal guild's use
of theater to deny its own theatricality. Interspliced with his painting a
vibrant picture of the emblem book with its immense wealth of meanings
is Goodrich's ongoing argument about the myths that the legal profession
marshals to create its own mystery, all of those incantations in obscure
languages, whether Latin or law French. He is thus focusing on the very
fact that the profession uses theater, but it also denies its theatricality. He
feels that it needs to resurrect the vital energy of the past reflected in the
188. Goodrich, supra note 16, at 790.
189. Kantorowicz, supra note 130, at 42.
190. Id. at 8-9. Kantorowicz states that the Elizabethan, "to say the least, was crypto-theological"
using "this semi-religious terminology." Id. at 16.
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emblem book at the same time as it recognizes how much it still draws
from mysticism, even to the extent of drawing on the mysticism of the
emblem books to enhance its own mystique.
As a guide for so much of his analysis in Legal Emblems and the Art of
Law, Goodrich turns to Giorgio Agamben. It is, then, for us to ask exactly
what Goodrich finally draws from Agamben, a philosopher who had long-
running debates with Derrida and Foucault, who has drawn so much
attention in the last couple of decades, and has also drawn so much
criticism. In part, we have to turn to Agamben, particularly the Agamben
of The Kingdom and the Glory. Jessica Whyte begins her study of
Agamben's political thought with a quotation from a speech that Agamben
gave in Notre Dame de Paris, where he tells his audience, including
significant members of the clergy: "An evocation of final things, of
ultimate things, has so completely disappeared from the statements of the
Church that it has been said, not without irony, that the Roman Church has
closed its eschatological window." 9 2 Reading Agamben is strong stuff.
Sergei Prozorov, in his study of Agamben's politics, talks of Agamben's
"strong messianic pathos."l93 Despite Agamben's deep immersion in
Christian political theology and Pauline teaching in The Kingdom and the
Glory, his eschatology is ultimately not Christian eschatology. Indeed,
Agamben's eschatology is finally not eschatological in the sense that the
redemption Agamben envisions does not come at the end of time-it is not
about final things. Rather, Agamben sees the present political order as
using a delaying tactic, essentially kicking the messianic can down the
road. Whyte talks of Agamben diagnosing an "eternal perpetuation of the
present."l94 By comparison, Prozorov describes Agamben's own
messianic vision as "the eruption of the kairos, a moment of rupture
within history that caries an emancipatory possibility." 9 s The
emancipatory or redemptive in Agamben thus comes within time and it
comes by way of the fusion of rule and administration. All the
apparatuses of the current social and economic order, all the
administration of the administrative state, halt. This is the inoperativity,
the redemptive cessation, that Agamben offers us in a politics that is
emphatically not active. Indeed, he has been criticized by Zifek, Hardt
and Negri, and a host of others for not offering an active politics or a post-
revolutionary order,' 96 for his redemptive moment is marked by extreme
passivity.
What, then, does Goodrich derive from Agamben? Goodrich turns to
192. JESSICA WHYTE, CATASTROPHE AND REDEMPTION: THE POLITICAL THOUGHT OF GIORGIO
AGAMBEN 1 (2013), citing GIORGIO AGAMBEN, THE CHURCH AND THE KINGDOM 27 (Leland De La
Durantayc trans., 2012).
193. PROZOROV,supra note 112, at 184.
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Agamben repeatedly, citing his analyses-such as the signification of
Glory as the empty throne-and adopting his formulations. Over and over
again, we hear Goodrich's recitation of the "crescendos of optical
images." We are, in fact, encouraged to see Agamben as perhaps the most
important key to various elements of Goodrich's mysterious emblem
world. Goodrich wants to tap the energy of the world of the emblem
book, and he turns to Agamben to help him tap that energy. Agamben is a
poetic force for Goodrich as he draws energy from Agamben's crescendos
of light. Nevertheless, Agamben is positioned as a scholarly source, so
that Goodrich will state that "Giorgio Agamben has developed this point
at length" and "Agamben, again, is instructive."'9 7 That does not mean
that Goodrich shares none of Agamben's politics. He shows fondness for
Agamben's retooling of Carl Schmitt's "state of exception" to view,
following response to 9/11, the modern state as essentially founded on the
"state of exception,"'98 and for Agamben's reworking of Guy Debord's
"society of the spectacle"l 99 -which was so important in May '68-as
part of his own critique of the spectacular society of modem capitalism
and its diverted attention. Nevertheless, it is Agamben's special vision
that is so attractive to Goodrich. It is only via Agamben that he can talk
about the emblem tradition being "time and again directed toward
indicating the divine causes of things and the angelological structure of
law." 2 00 If it is odd to see the very playful Goodrich-the Goodrich who
can utter with regard to his book, "obscurely brilliant as the present study
may be deemed" 20 1-following Agamben's lead, it is because Agamben
has captured Goodrich's imagination.
It is interesting that the conclusion to Legal Emblems and the Art ofLaw
does not reference Agamben's name a single time despite the references to
the "angelological structure of the law" and to "choral glamor and glory"
as well as displaying other characteristically Agambian formulations and
thought patterns. In his conclusion, Goodrich makes an effort to go step
by step through a series of observations on how the legal emblem and
images function. He starts by asserting-a bit counter-intuitively
considering his view of the multivalence of the image-that "none of
these legal visibilities, historical and contemporary, are left to chance."20 2
In fact, as theatrical as law is, it is the product of "carefully wrought
staging."2 03 Goodrich will repeat his conviction of the "primacy of the
legal image" in the emblem book and turn to the paradox of the emblem
being a humanistic invention whose subject matter was nonetheless
197. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 94, 96.
198. GIORGIO AGAMBEN, STATE OF EXCEPTION (Kevin Attell trans., 2005).
199. GuY DEBORD, SOCIETY OF THE SPECTACLE (Black & Red, 2010) (1967).






Landauer: Legal Emblems and the Return of the Impressed
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository, 2015
Yale Journal of Law & the Humanities
dogmatic.20 It is no surprise that this paradox hardly limits the fluidness
of the image. If "law collides with aesthetics and poetics,"2 05 the result is
nevertheless creative. This is where Goodrich talks of the period of the
emblem book as "the inescapably creative moment of legal regulation." 2 06
If the emblem book is humanistic, it engages a variety of disciplinary
realms. And by using images, it is "populist in scope" but leads quickly to
"opaque matter." The emblem book's very populism serves to underscore
the special access involved in legal knowledge. That brings Goodrich to
the functional relationship between image and text: "The words lead to the
image, and the image to the message that cannot be seen or stated." 20 7 He
refers to the "apparent control of the image by the word" but, clearly, the
word does not control, for there is an inscription that "precedes writing: a
first law." 208 For Goodrich, that first law, that inscription, precedes the
stated word. The emblem book, he tells us, "requires a theoretical opening
to the image, a reversal of the singularly textualist and transcendentally
literalist attitude of modern lawyers."2 09
As a continuation of Goodrich's ongoing project, Legal Emblems and
the Art of Law describes the emblem book as conveying multiple
meanings as Goodrich repeatedly talks of its multivalence and, as he
interprets one emblem, makes an aside that "it has greater, different, and
many more meanings than are currently contemplated." 21 0 Goodrich is
well ensconced in the valorization of the aporia, which has been one of
the hallmarks of poststructuralist writing for decades-we can now only
look with pity at William Empson, whose pre-structuralist fervor for New
Critical complexity led him to only seven types of ambiguity.21' And as
Goodrich did in his previous works, he uses the emblem book to bring
multiple disciplines to law. This is not merely a matter of adding art
history and some iconographical, perhaps even iconological, insight, but
rather looking at the visual in a much deeper sense. If no one could expect
that his study of early modern emblem books would involve chirology, the
rhetorical art of hand gestures, more importantly Goodrich turns over and
over notions about what the visual means and where the visible points to
the invisible. Goodrich's book also attempts to hit multiple registers,
using the theatrical and the choral to transcend the merely human register.
All of this is meant to expand his earlier project, the re-enchantment of
law. Perhaps Legal Discourse was less about enchantment than the social
context of discourse, but it already meant an enriching of a hide-bound
204. Id. at 248.
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legal discipline. But, certainly, Law and the Courts of Love champions a
re-enchantment of law, reintroducing law's past enchantment. So too does
Goodrich's legal emblem book attempt a radical re-enchantment of law
through its confrontation with that earlier, "inescapably creative moment
of legal regulation."
The re-enchantment of law through the emblem book tradition also
introduces Goodrich's reader into a world of the mysterious. All those
strange images did not merely lead to the invisible simply in the common
sense of common law's being rooted in the immeasurable past, that the
truths of the common law predate the work of the legislator. Here the
mystical is otherworldly, not only with divine hands reaching into the
visual plane of the emblem book image, but otherworldly interactions with
the otherworldly. One of the final images of Goodrich's book, from
Francis Quarles's Emblems, shows a kneeling individual with an arrow
bursting upward from his chest and three more arrows, each with a narrow
banner with words, racing into a heavenly image of the sun, which has two
detached human ears and a hand reaching out from its core. This is a
strange and mysterious image coming toward the very end of a book
populated by strange and mysterious images, for Goodrich has clearly
established his subject-matter as mysterious. And he uses Agamben to
good effect here. All those Agambian references to angelological orders,
to choral glamour, and to crescendos of optical images at once add to the
mystery of the emblem book and engage Goodrich's study in a genealogy
of the mysterious.
But I would like to go further and suggest that Goodrich wraps himself
up in mystery. To some degree he is very playful in this-"My point,
however, is highly specific and somewhat unusual."2 12 Goodrich
underscores that emblem images opened up a world to a lay audience,
making the image world easily seen, but the accessibility had its limits and
inevitably led to opacity. The images, he instructs us, obscure at the same
time that they reveal. We should, I think, understand Goodrich as creating
his own opacity just as he reveals the liveliness of the legal emblem.
Goodrich oddly makes quite a deal about his five-point conclusion,
suggesting that his final remarks are fairly straightforward. Indeed, my
short overview above takes short cuts and does not faithfully replicate the
complexity and the opacity of his concluding pages. Reading Goodrich, it
is clear that he himself clouds our ability to understand exactly where his
study lands. He uses Agamben not only to enter a mysterious realm of
study but also to introduce mystery into the study's methodology. If
Sergei Prozorov is right, no one can quite get Agamben, not Derrida, not
Foucault, and not the collaboration of Hardt and Negri. Agamben offers
more than late-poststructuralist, high-theory bona fides; he adds an extra
212. GOODRICH, supra note 1, at 250.
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layer of esotericism to Goodrich's study. I have mentioned that Goodrich
does not let the colleges of emblem specialists or constitutional historians
frame his subject-Skinner and Pocock's renderings of political thought,
despite their immense sophistication, would prove just too banal next to
Agamben's reworking of Carl Schmitt's "state of exception" in the
aftermath of 9/11. Goodrich is quite convincing on the theatricality of the
current legal profession's denying its own theatricality. And he
understands that despite the virtues of the theatricality of emblem book
creators, that theater also constituted a warding off, the opacity of the
emblem that makes its interpretation a priestly labor by the legal expert-
"only the pure, the poets, priests, lawyers, gain knowledge." 2 13 So, too,
Goodrich has engaged in a self-mythologizing as his book also involves a
warding off.
213. Id. at 258.
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Figure 1. Custom as Second Nature (consuetudo est altera natura), in
Jacobus Bornitius, EMBLEMATUM ETHICO-POLITICORUM (Heidelberg:
Bourgeat 1654) emblem 45. Courtesy of Beinecke Rare Book and
Manuscript Library, Yale University.
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Figure 2. Edward VI and the Pope (c. 1568 group portrait). C National
Portrait Gallery, London.
Figure 3. The Prince's Administration (aministri principum), in
Solorzano, EMBLEMATA emblem 54. Courtesy of the Rare Book
Collection, Lillian Goldman Law Library, Yale Law School.
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